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LEGISLATION
THE UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT IN MISSOURI
INTRODUCTION
On September 10, 1947, the Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act, with a few minor changes, became the law of Missouri.1
The act was drafted by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in order to provide workable rules for the distribution of
the property of two or more deceased persons when the sequence
of their deaths is decisive as regards the rights of those claiming
property through them and when there is "no sufficient evidence"
of that sequence. 2 The facts of the recent Missouri case of
Stewart v. Russsdl3 point up the problem which the act is in-
tended to cover. There a woman, her second husband, and her
daughter by her previous marriage were found dead of carbon
monoxide poisoning under such circumstances that the order of
their deaths could not be judicially ascertained without the aid
of procedural devices. The woman's first husband brought suit
to determine title to a house owned by the woman. It was his
contention that, since the daughter survived her mother, title
devolved upon him.' The basic factual issue to be decided, ie.,
whether or not the daughter survived her mother, was clear.
The difficulty was that the evidence needed to determine that
issue, upon which depended the question of who had the right
to the property, was inconclusive. Since the case originated
prior to the Uniform Act, the decision was based on the major-
ity common law rule, which will be noted below. But, regardless
of what particular rule was adopted in that case, it should be
noted that the court in such a situation is at a loss to decide the
case consistently with the actual facts because those facts,
indispensable to such a decision, are not to be had. If the court
is to make any ruling at all, it must of necessity be based on
some arbitrary rule.
1. 31o. REv. STAT. §§ 471.010-471.080 (1949).
2. Commissioner's Prefatory Note, Uniform Simultaneous Death Act,
9A U.L.A. 264 (1951).
3. 227 S.W.2d 1011 (Mo. 1950).
4. Alo. REv. STAT. § 468.010 (1949).
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This note first discusses the rules that were developed prior
to the Uniform Act in an attempt to reach a fair result in such
cases, and secondly the effect of the Uniform Act on those rules.
I. THE RULES PRIOR TO THE UNIFORM SIMULTANEOUS
DEATH ACT
In cases in which two or more persons perished in a common
disaster there was at common law no presumption, either of
simultaneous death of the commorientes or of survivorship of
one of them. The rule was that the party who claimed to derive
title to property by virtue of the survivorship of one of the
deceased parties had to prove the fact of survival of that person
through whom he claimed, and that if he failed to sustain the
burden, his case failed.6 As Judge Wightman stated in Under-
wood v. Wing,7 "We may guess or imagine or fancy, but the law
of England requires evidence [of the order of survivorship]
." Missouri followed this common law rule;8 thus, in the
Stewart case, because the first husband's claim to the house was
dependent on the daughter's having outlived her mother, the
burden of proving the daughter's survival was on him. Because
he failed to prove that fact to the satisfaction of the court, he
lost the case, and the result was that the property descended to
the heirs at law of the woman and her second husband.'
5. As will be pointed out later, the term "common disaster" is not an
accurate term to describe the event that calls any of the rules into
operation, but it is used here for the sake of brevity. It is inaccurate
because both the common law rule and the Uniform Act have been applied
in situations that can hardly be called "disasters" in the sense of public
calamities. Examples of this broad application of the two rules in Mis-
souri are Stewart v. Russell, 227 S.W.2d 1011 (Mo. 1050); U.S.CasualtyCo. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 69 S.W. 370 (1902) (where a man and his
daughter perished in the sinking of a yacht); Adams v. Gardener, 237
S.W.2d 495 (Mo. App. 1951) (where husband and wife were found dead).For other cases involving events that can hardly be termed disasters and
in which the common law rule was applied, see Tracy and Adams, Evi-
dence of Survivorship in Common Disaster Cases, 38 MicH. L. REV. 801(1940). See Uniform Simultaneous Death Act 9A U.L.A. 265-268 (1951)
and Supplement, pp. 32-33 for cases of the same type in which the Uni-
form Act was applied.
6. For collection of cases, see 25 C.J.S. 1069-1071 (1941).
7. 4 De G.M.&G., 633, 657-658, 43 Eng. Rep. 655. 664 (1854).
8. Stewart v. Russell, 227 S.W.2d 1011 (Mo. 1950); U.S. Casualty Co. v.
Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 69 S.W. 370 (1902).
9. Stewart v. Russell, 227 S.W.2d 1011 (Mo. 1950). Contra: In re Evans'Estate, 228 Iowa 908, 291 N.W. 460 (1940). There a husband and wife
died intestate in an automobile accident, and the issue arose as to who had
the right to the wife's estate, the collateral heirs of the wife or the son of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss3/5
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In its practical effect, the common law rule which purported to
discard presumptions and to require evidence was equivalent to
a presumption of simultaneous death. If this presumption were
applied to the facts of the Stewart case, the result would be that
there would be no time between the deaths of the mother and
daughter during which title to the house would vest in the
daughter. Since the plaintiff's title depended on the title of the
daughter and since she had no title, his claim would necessarily
fail." That many courts realized that this was the outcome of
the burden of proof rule is indicated by the statement in a large
number of the cases to the effect that in the absence of evidence
as to survivorship, the property in question will be disposed of
as if the deaths were simultaneous.112 A minority of courts ruled
expressly that in cases of death in a common disaster, a pre-
sumption of synchronous death would be invoked, 22 but the
greater number took pains to point out that there is no presump-
tion to that effect and that it is merely the practice in such cases
to distribute the property as if the parties had perished at the
same moment
23
the husband by a former marriage. The court held that the collateral heirs
of the wife had the burden of proving the absence of other heirs entitled
to take in preference to them, which in effect meant that the collateral heirs
had to prove the non-survivorship of the husband. Failing to sustain this
burden, they lost. Carpenter v. Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W. 448
(1925), an earlier Iowa case which followed the general common law rule,
was distinguished on the ground that it involved the construction of a will,
whereas in this case the disagreement was over an inheritance.
10. See In re Wilbor, 70 R.I. 126, 37 At]. 634 (1897).
11. Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U.S. 401 (1903);
Middeke v. Balder, 198 Il. 590, 64 N.E. 1002 (1902); Carpenter v. Severin,
201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W. 448 (1925); Russell v. Hallett, 23 Kan. 276 (1880);
Johnson v. Merithew, 80 Me. 111, 13 Atl. 132 (1888); Cowman v. Rodgers,
75 Md. 403, 21 At]. 64 (1891); Moore v. Palen, 228 Minn. 148, 36 N.W.2d
540 (1949); Daniels v. Bush, 311 Miss. 1, 50 So.2d 563 (1951); Stewart
v. Russell, 227 S.W.2d 1011 (Mo. 1950) ; In re Wilbor, 70 R.I. 126, 37 Atl.
634 (1897). For other cases, see Note, 43 A.L.R. 348 (1926).
12. Kansas Pacific R.R. v. Miller, 2 Colo. 442 (1874). In a few other
eases there are express statements that there is a presumption of simul-
taneous death along with quotations to the effect that the practice in
the absence of evidence is merely to distribute the property as if the commo-
rientes had died at the same instant. The result is that it is difficult to
tell which side of this academic point the court was on. See Colovos v.
Gouvas, 269 Ky. 752, 108 S.W.2d 820 (1937); Garbee v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry., 220 Mo. App. 1245, 290 S.W. 655 (1927); Walton v. Burchell,
121 Tenn. 715, 121 S.W. 391 (1907).
13. Middeke v. Balder, 198 Il. 590, 64 N.E. 1002 (1902); Carpenter v.
Severin, 201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W. 448 (1925); Russell v. Hallett, 23 Kan.
276 (1880); Johnson v. Merithew, 80 Me. 111, 13 At]. 132 (1888); Daniels
v. Bush, 211 Miss. 1, 50 So.2d 563 (1951); Stewart v. Russell, 227 S.W.2d
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The burden of proof rule was subject to two chief criticisms.
In the first place, it begged the question. The dilemma of decid-
ing what to do with the property arose because of the impos-
sibility of ascertaining which decedent predeceased the other,
and yet the rule in effect required the party who claimed on the
basis of the survivorship of one of the commorientes to prove
that survivorship, a demand for the impossible.1 ' The second
defect in the rule was shown in the famous English case of Wing
v. Angrave,1 5 in which its strict application did violence to the
clear intention of the testator. There a Mrs. Underwood by her
will appointed certain property to her husband, subject to some
interests of her children, with the proviso that "in case my
said husband should die in my lifetime," the property was to go
to William Wing. Her husband's will contained substantially
the same provisions. Both testators perished in the same storm
at sea, and William Wing claimed the property of both of them
under the substitutional gifts clauses. The House of Lords ruled
that the burden of proof was on Wing to show that one of the
spouses died in the other's lifetime and that, being unable to
show this, he could not take under either will. On the question
of intention of the testators, the Lords felt that the only inten-
tion in both wills was that the gifts to Wing were dependent on
the death of one of them in the lifetime of the other. The Amer-
ican courts on similar facts refused to follow this decision, ruling
that where the intention was sufficiently expressed that the sub-
stitute legatee should take in the event that the other bequests
should fail, that intention should not be defeated on the ground
that an accidental wording in the will shifted the onus probandi
to the substitutional legatee.21 Thus in a case in which the tes-
tator devised property to her son and provided that "in the event
of my becoming the survivor.., of my son" then the property
was to go to the Young Women's Christian Home, and the tes-
tator and her son died under circumstances affording no evi-
1011 (Mo. 1950); In re Wilbor, 20 I. 126, 37 Atl. 634 (1897). For argu-
ments against this approach, see Wislizenus, Survival in Death by Common
Disaster, 6 ST. Louis L. REv. 1 (1925) and Whittier, Problems of Sur-
vivorship, 16 GRE-.N BAG 237 (1904).
14. Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 264 (1951).
15. 8 H.L. Cas. 183, 11 Eng. Rep. 397 (1860).
16. Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U.S. 401 (1903);
St. John v. Andrews Institute, 191 N.Y. 254, 83 N.E. 981 (1908); Fitz-
gerald v. Ayers, 179 S.W. 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss3/5
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dence as to the order of their deaths, it was held that the
property should go to the Home.1 7 The court felt that these
words showed that the testator did not intend to die intestate,
that she wanted the Home to take if the devise to her son should
be ineffectual, and that this intention should prevail in spite of
the fact that the provision describing the condition under which
the Home was to take said "in the event of my becoming the sur-
vivor ... of my son" instead of saying "if my son should not
survive me, then I give and bequeath my property to the
Home."
Discontent with the common law rule was evidenced in other
ways.19 In 1925, Parliament enacted a statute which set up
the arbitrary presumption that in common disaster situations,
the "deaths shall... be presumed to have occurred in order of
seniority, and, accordingly, the younger shall be deemed to have
survived the elder." 20 In the United States a considerable
number of legislatures passed statutes which adopted substan-
tially the arbitrary presumptions of survivorship of the Napo-
leonic Code.21 That Code provided that if persons entitled to
inherit from one another perish in the same accident so that it
is not possible to ascertain which of them died first, the eldest
shall be presumed to have survived if those who perished were
17. Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U.S. 401 (1903).
18. Id. at 417, 418.
19. In Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Kacer, 96 Mo. App. 93, 69
S.W. 671 (1902), the court said: "The wisdom of the common law in never
indulging a presumption as to which of several persons who perished in
the same disaster survived the longest has been unduly vaunted; for the
civil law has recourse to that means of settling disputes concerning own-
ership of property only in instances where there is no proof, and then
it becomes absolutely necessary to determine the ownership by some rule
more or less arbitrary. The presumptions of those continental codes ... are
more apt to hit the truth than others, because they are based on attributes
of age and sex which for the average strength of individuals, and their
ability to prolong lives in shipwrecks or other disasters in which strength
may be useful in the struggle to live. While the common law explicitly
rejects all presumptions and insists on proof in every case, it implicitly
accepts one; . .. that the property shall be disposed of as though all the
deceased persons through whom the litigants claim died at the same in-
stant, unless there is proof to show otherwise has all the consequences
of a presumption of simultaneous death." Id. at 100, 69 S.W. at 673.
20. Law of Property Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 20, § 184.
21. CAL. CODS Civ. PRoc. art. 1963, §40 (1931); LA. Cxv. CoDE arts.
726-729 (1870); MD. LAws c. 108 § 168 (1920); MONT. REV. CODS ANN.§ 10-606 (40) (1935); NsV. ComP. LAWS § 9047.07 (40) (1938); ORE. CO.MP.
LAWs ANN. § 2-407 (41) (1940); Wyo. R.v. STAT. c. 88, art. 40, § 4008(1931). For other statutory solutions prior to the Uniform Act. see GA.
CODE § 113-906 (1933) and OHio GEN. Coun ANN. § 10503-18 (1938).
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under fifteen years of age; that if they were all above sixty,
the youngest shall be presumed to have survived; that if all
those who died were in the fifteen to sixty year old classification,
the male shall be presumed to have survived provided the age
difference was not over one year; and that if of the same sex, the
younger shall be presumed to have survived.2 2
These rules also had drawbacks. The English rule made the
decisive factor age, which is clearly not the most important evi-
dentiary element in deciding which commorient survived.23 The
civil law presumptions sometimes militated against human
nature-for example, when a man and his wife, both being
between the ages of fifteen and sixty and there being no more
than one year's difference in their ages, drowned in the sinking
of a ship. It seems reasonable to assume that the man would
try to prolong the life of his wife even at the cost of sacrificing
his own, but the civil law presumed conclusively that the hus-
band lived longer.2 '
With these considerations in mind, the provisions of the Uni-
form Act can now be evaluated.
II. THE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY
The first section of Missouri's Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act provides:
Where the title to property or the devolution thereof de-
pends upon priority of death and there is no sufficient
evidence that the persons have died otherwise than simul-
taneously, as determined by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, the property of each person shall be disposed of as if
he had survived except as provided otherwise in this law.25
The first observation is that, although the provision does not
by its terms contain a presumption of simultaneous death as a
method for dealing with the problem, its application, with one
modification, achieves the same effect.25 However, the presump-
tion is clearly a rebuttable one, as is indicated by the qualifying
clause "and there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have
22. Chapman, Presumptions of Survivorship, 62 U. OF PA. L. REv. 585
1914.
23. Conway and Bertsche, The New York Simultaneous Death Law, 13
FORD. L. REV. 17, 20 (1914); Tracy and Adams, supra note 5 at 80L
24. WIGMORE, ED ENCE § 2532a (3rd ed. 1940).
25. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 471.010 (1949).
26. See Sauers v. Stolz, 121 Colo. 456, 218 P.2d 741 (1951). There the
statute is treated as adopting a presumption of simultaneous death.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss3/5
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died otherwise than simultaneously, as determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction .... " For the purposes of clarity in
presentation, the discussion of when this limiting clause is
applicable will be deferred until the end of the note.
The facts of the Stewart case 2 form a good basis for illustrat-
ing the truth of the first mentioned proposition in a situation
in which neither of the decedents has made a will. With the
application of the presumption of coinstantaneous death, there
would be no time during which title to the mother's home could
vest by descent in the daughter. Similarly, there would still be
no time for such vesting if the mother's property is to be dis-
tributed as if she had survived. In both situations, the claim of
the first husband, based on the survivorship of the daughter,
fails. Since the common law rule was that in the absence of evi-
dence as to the order of death the property was to be distributed
as if all parties died at the same time, it would appear that in
cases of intestacy the new enactment is merely a codification of
the practice under the common law rule.2
Although there are no Missouri cases in point, it seems clear
that the same conclusion would be true if a testator and a bene-
ficiary under his will were the commorientes. Under the prac-
tice engaged in prior to the Uniform Act, if the beneficiary were
not a relative within the meaning of the anti-lapse statute,29
or if he were a relative but left no lineal descendants, the devise
or legacy would lapse,30 there being no time during which it
could vest in the beneficiary, and, therefore, those claiming
through the beneficiary would lose. Disposing of the property
as if the testator outlived the devisee or legatee also would
result in there being no time for the title to pass to the devisee
or legatee. If the devi~ee were a relative under the anti-lapse
statute and if his heirs were lineal descendants, then the ques-
tion as to whether the heirs of the devisee would be able to
27. Stewart v. Russell, 227 S.W.2d 1011 (Mo. 1951).
28. In re Di Bella's Estate, 100 N.Y.S.2d 763 (Surr. Ct. 1950); In re
Cruson's Estate, 189 Ore. 537, 221 P.2d 892 (1950).
29. Mo. REV. STAT. § 468.310 (1949) provides as follows: "When any
estate shall be devised to any child, grandchild, or other relative of the
testator, and such devisee shall die before the testator, leaving lineal de-
scendants, such descendants shall take the estate, real or personal, as such
devisee would have done in case he had survived the testator."
30. PAc, WILLS § 1414 (3rd ed. 1941).
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take under the Will 51 by virtue of the anti-lapse statute would
depend primarily on whether the court interpreted the language
of the anti-lapse statute, "and such devisee shall die before the
testator," as creating a condition precedent to the rights of the
devisee's heirs. The two decisions on this issue of construction
are conflicting. In Carpenter v. Severin,32 a case involving an
anti-lapse statute very similar in wording to the Missouri code
provision, the Supreme Court of Iowa ruled that such a clause
did spell out a condition precedent to the rights of the devisee's
heirs and that, since they failed to sustain the burden of prov-
ing its occurrence, their claim failed. However, in New York
which has an anti-lapse statute that is in substance the same
as the Missouri code provision,3 3 the rule is that to deny the
successors of the beneficiary the property simply because the
beneficiary died contemporaneously with the testator instead
of having died in the testator's lifetime would be to violate the
spirit of the statute.3' This approach recommends itself as
being the more reasonable of the two, and Missouri should not
refrain from adopting it merely because the wording in the
statute in Carpenter v. Severin is more similar to the Missouri
code section than the New York anti-lapse provision. However,
it should be noted that, no matter whether the common law rule
or the formula of the Uniform Act is applied to this particular
situation, the outcome, for the reasons given at the beginning
of this paragraph, will be the same, i.e., against the heirs of
the devisee. The additional problem as to whether they still
might take depends on the meaning to be given to the anti-lapse
statute.
There is, however, one set of facts in which the application
31. In Stolle v. Stolle, 66 S.W.2d 912 (Mo. 1933), the court said that the
lineal descendant of the devisee predeceasing the testator does not derive
title from or through the devisee but directly from the testator by pur-
chase.
32. 201 Iowa 969, 204 N.W. 448 (1925).
33. New York Decedent Law, Section 29 provides as follows: "Whenever
any estate, real or personal, shall be devised or bequeathed to a child or
other descendant of the testator or to a brother or sister of the testator,
and such legatee or devisee shall die during the lifetime of the testator,
leaving a child or other descendant who shall survive said testator, such
devise or legacy shall not lapse, but the property so devised or bequeathed
shall vest in the surviving child or other descendant of the legatee or
devisee, as if such legatee or devisee had survived the testator and had died
intestate."
34. In re Macklin's Will, 177 Misc. 432, 30 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss3/5
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of the rule of the Uniform Act will supersede certain reasoning
used at common law as the basis for a particular result. That
is the case in which the testator makes a gift over in the event
that he survives the primary beneficiary and then both testator
and primary beneficiary die in a common disaster. A case in
point is Young Women's Christian Home v. French.35 The facts
of that suit describe a situation in which the testator had pro-
vided for a gift over to the Home in the event that she became
the survivor of her son, the primary beneficiary. She and her
son died under circumstances affording no evidence as to the
order of their deaths. Under the strict common law rule, the
devise would have lapsed because neither could the son's suc-
cessors have proved that he outlined his mother nor could the
Home have established that the mother survived. Consequently,
the property would have descended to the heirs of the testator.
The use of a presumption of simultaneous death would have
achieved the same result since there would have been no time
during which the estate could pass to the son, and the Home
would not be able to overcome the presumption by showing that
the testator survived. However, the court in that case refused
to permit the property to pass by intestacy to the heirs of the
testator, on the ground that the testator showed clearly her
intention that the Home was to take in the event that the gift
to the son should fail.3 Had the formula of the Uniform Act
been applied to the facts, there would have been no need to
decide the case on the ground noted above, since the act provides
that the property of each commorient "shall be disposed of as
if he had survived.. ." The testator would have been deemed
to have survived as regards her property, and thus the estate
would have gone to the Home under the will. In effect, then,
the Uniform Act dispenses with the need of employing, the
above ground as the reason for allowing the substitute bene-
ficiary to take.
Despite that one minor variation, it can be safely concluded
that, from the point of view of who is to get the property in
dispute, the adoption of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act
has not changed the law in common disaster cases .3 A compari-
35. Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U.S. 401 (1903).
36. Id. at 417, 418.
37. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, 9A U.L.A. § 1 (1951).
38. See note 28 supr.
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son of the result achieved by applying both rules to the Stewart
case, supra, indicates clearly that such a conclusion is true as
regards intestacy cases in Missouri. The discussion of the prob-
lem raised when the relationship of the commorientes is testator-
devisee indicates that the same conclusion applies to that aspect
of the subject as well.
However, it would seem that the fact that the new law con-
tains an implied presumption of simultaneous death has ren-
dered the ruling in the Missouri case of Abrams v. Unknown
Heirs of Rice- ' obsolete. There the bodies of a husband and his
wife were found in the bathroom of their home, and the evidence
introduced related to only the fact that one was nude and the
other was not and to the relative positions of their bodies. The
trial judge said: "I do find -that they both died simultaneously,
and in the same common disaster, and determine the question
as if both died at the same moment."40 The Missouri Supreme
Court upheld this finding by the trial court If the Supreme
Court really intended to say that the evidence was sufficient to
show synchronous death, then, in view of the difficulty in prov-
ing the factual issue involved, its decision cannot be easily
justified on the ground that it was based on an adequate quan-
tum of proof. 41 With the implied presumption of contempora-
neous death, the need for straining the facts in order to reach
a desired result, as was apparently done in that case, will be
obviated since the presumption itself will tilt the balance in that
direction.
III. THE PROVISION REGARDING SUCCESSIVE BENEFICIARIES
The second section of Missouri's version of the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act provides as follows:
Where two or more beneficiaries are designated to take suc-
cessively by reason of survivorship under another person's
disposition of property and there is no sufficient evidence
that these beneficiaries have died otherwise than simul-
taneously, as determined by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, the property thus disposed of shall be divided into
as many equal portions as there are successive beneficiaries
39. 317 .fo. 216, 295 S.W. 83 (1927).
40. Id. at 219, 295 S.W. at 84.
41. See Wislizenus, supra note 13 at 1; Note, 13 Mo.LREv. 230 (1948).
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and these portions shall be distributed respectively to those
who would have taken in the event that each designated
beneficiary had survived.' 2
There is considerable difficulty in apprehending the exact
meaning of this section. One set of facts which has been given
as an example of a situation which this provision might have
been intended to cover is as follows: A devises land to B for
life, remainder to C if living at B's death, but if C does not
survive B, then to D in fee. B, C, and D die under circumstances
from which the order of their deaths cannot be determined."3
At common law, the heirs of C could not prove that C survived
nor could the heirs of D prove that C did not outlive B. The
result would be a deadlock, and the land would revert back to
the heirs of the testator contrary to his intention. It might very
well be said that this provision of the Uniform Act is applicable
to such a situation and that the result of its operation would
be that one-half of the property should go to the heirs of C and
one-half to the heirs of D. The heirs of B, of course, would have
no rights since B's estate was only for life. The only question
as to the value of this hypothetical case as an example of what
set of facts the above quoted section is supposed to cover is
centered around the word "successively." Can it be fairly said
that the above limitation provides that C and D take "succes-
sively"? It would seem that a more exact description of their
respective rights would be "alternately." Several states appar-
ently realized the lack of clarity in the meaning of "successively"
and have inserted the phrases "or alternately" and "or alter-
nate" after the words "successively" and "successive" in their
version of the Uniform Act"
Anotler instance where this provision might apply is as
follows: X by will, deed, or trust instrument provides that his
land is to go to A and B for their joint lives, the remainder in
fee to go to the survivor of them. A and B then die under cir-
cumstances from which the order of their deaths cannot be
judicially ascertained. 5 Before the Uniform Act, the limitation
42. Mo. REV. STAT. § 471.020 (1949).
43. The above is in substance the same example as that given by Dean
Wigmore for a prior draft of this Section. See 1939 HANDBOOK OF
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMiMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 194.
44. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 58-702 (Supp. 1947); MASS. ANN. LAws c. 190A,§ 2 (Supp. 1950); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1307-2 (Supp. 1943).
45. Note, 13 Mo. L. REV. 230 (1948).
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providing for the remainder in fee would have failed because
neither the successors of A nor B could prove that the person
through whom they claimed survived. The result would have
been that the estate would revert to the grantor or his heirs.
If this set of facts is covered by the statutory provision under
discussion, its application would give one-half of the estate to
the heirs of A and one-half to the heirs of B. However, as in
the last hypothetical situation, this set of facts is subject to the
argument that A and B would take the fee alternatively and not
successively and that thus this section cannot be invoked. It is
true that both A and B would have life estates before one of
them would be entitled to the fee and that in this sense the
survivor takes successively, but such a construction of the facts
seems rather contrived. The meaning of the word "successively"
still remains as the factor inhibiting the possible use of this
section.
A third disposition of property which might fall under the
scope of this section is the case where X by will, deed, or trust
agreement grants land to A for life, remainder to B and his
heirs, but if B dies leaving descendants, then to B's descendants
in fee whenever B may die, whether before or after A's death. B
has one married daughter who has no issue by her marriage. B
makes a will devising the property to C, and then dies in a
common disaster with his daughter. C claims the land by virtue
of B's will, and the husband of B's daughter attempts to claim
through his wife. Under the common law rule it seems clear
that the husband would have the burden of proving the survivor-
ship of his wife (B's daughter) because it is only in that way
that his contention can be sustained. Necessarily failing to sus-
tain this burden, he would lose, and the property would go to
C under B's will. Under the new rule, if applied, one-half of
the property would go to the husband of B's daughter and one-
half to C under B's will. Still, however, there is the very force-
ful argument that, if there had been no problem as to who
survived between B and his daughter, C would have taken to
the exclusion of the daughter's husband or vice versa and that
thus the "successive" beneficiaries were really "alternate" bene-
ficiaries. In turn, this would mean that this provision could not
be used.
On the basis of the above considerations, it may be concluded
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that there is great difficulty in envisaging a situation to which
the last mentioned contention could not be well made. Because
of that fact, the utility of this provision is, at best, questionable.
It is submitted that the additions of the phrase "or alternately"
after the word "successively" and the phrase "or alternate"
after the word "successive" would greatly improve Missouri's
version of this section by removing the ambiguity now present
in it.
IV. THE PROVISION APPLICABLE TO JOINT TENANTS
Section 471.030 of the Missouri Act reads as follows:
Where there is no sufficient evidence that two joint tenants
or tenants by entirety have died otherwise than simul-
taneously as determined by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, the property so held shall be distributed one-half as if
one had survived and one-half as if the other had survived.
If there are more than two joint tenants and all of them
have so died, the property thus distributed shall be in the
proportion that one bears to the whole number of joint
tenants.
Prior to the Uniform Act, there was only one American case
where tenants of either type had perished under circumstances
from which the sequence of their deaths could not be deter-
mined.41 In McGhee v. Henry,47 where a husband and wife, ten-
ants by the entireties, had died in the same fire, the court ruled
that the estate descended as a tenancy in common and that the
two classes of heirs were each entitled to one-half of it. Dicta
in the Missouri case of Barnett v. Couey" indicate that Missouri
is in accord with this ruling. There one tenant by the entirety
had killed the other tenant, and the question arose as to whether
the heirs of the wrongdoer, who had committed suicide after
the murder, were entitled to the whole of the estate by virtue
of the murderer's survivorship. In its discussion, the court said:
If James Washington [the murderer] and Cora Washington
[the victim] had died simultaneously, then obviously James
46. In the early English case of Bradshaw v. Toulmin, 2 Dick. 635, 21
Eng. Rep. 417 (1784), Lord Thurlow stated that if joint tenants perish by
one blow, the jointly held estate will remain in their respective heirs asjoint tenants. Blackstone, on the other hand, believed that a tenancy in
common would result. 2 BL. COMM.* 180.
47. 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S.W. 509 (1921).
48. 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
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Washington could not be the widower of Cora, and defen-
dant [the administrator of James' estate] would not be
entitled to more than one-half of the funds in question."
Later in the same case the court made the further statement:
Under the peculiar circumstances here present, neither
divestiture of interest nor survivorship exists in contempla-
tion of law as to either [of the tenants]. The fund [prop-
erty] should go just as provided where there is a common
calamity and both tenants die simultaneously. . . . the
husband could not qualify as the legal surviving widower.
Therefore there is no survivor directly entitled to take and
the fund descends as if it were formerly held as tenants in
common to be distributed according to the statute of
descent.5 '
It will be noted that the application of the new rule to the facts
of the McGhee case would not lead to a different result. As
regards one-half of the estate, the husband would be deemed to
have survived, and thus his heirs would be entitled to that half.
The successors of the wife would get the other half on the same
principle. Thus at the outset it may be concluded that from the
point of view of the distribution of the estate, the Uniform Act
represents a codification of the common law rule.
The question has been raised as to whether the scope of this
section is limited to joint tenancies and tenancies by the en-
tireties or whether it covers situations involving joint owner-
ship with the right of survivorship. 5 The recent Missouri case
of Adams v. Gardener 2 seems to answer that query. There the
controversy centered around who had prior right to a sum of
money in a safe deposit box rented by a husband with his wife
as deputy. The husband and wife died commorient, and the re-
spective heirs of each claimed the property. The evidence dis-
closed that the couple owned their homestead as tenants by the
entireties and that they had a joint bank account, which included
cash and certain savings bonds payable to the husband or wife.
Prior to the rental of the box in dispute, the couple had told a
friend that they kept a large sum of money in their house. The
friend warned them of the danger of such a practice and advised
49. Id. at 921, 27 S.W.2d at 76L
50. Id. at 923, 27 S.W.2d at 762.
51. Note, 9 OHio ST. L. J. 648 (1948).
52. 237 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. App. 1951).
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them to rent a safe deposit box in which to place their money.
Following the friend's suggestion, they rented the box in the
above manner, presumably because it was the next best thing to
renting the box under a joint deposit agreement, which practice
was discouraged by the bank officials. During the interval be-
tween the rental of the box and their deaths, the husband opened
the box ten times and the wife once. Three separate portions of
the total sum, which amounted to $7020, were found in the box
enclosed in two envelopes and in plain wrapping paper, and none
of these bundles were identified. On the basis of these facts, the
Kansas City Court of Appeals inferred that the two had treated
the money as jointly owned and upheld the trial court's judg-
ment, which under the Uniform Act gave one-half of the cash
to each of the two groups of heirs. Thus mere joint ownership
is sufficient in Missouri as a basis for invoking the act when
the joint owners die under circumstances from which the order
of their deaths cannot be ascertained.
In addition, it seems clear that if a case were to arise in
Missouri in which one tenant by the entirety (or joint tenant)
killed the other tenant by the entirety (or joint tenant) and in
which there was no evidence of who survived, the property would
be distributed under the act in the same manner as it would be
distributed if there were no crime involved. In New York the
problem may well arise as to whether such a situation will con-
stitute an exception to the statutory rule because the courts of
that state have ruled that the heirs of the felonious tenant have
no right to any of the estate, much less one-half of it.5s That
such an exception will probably not arise in Missouri is indicated
in Barnett, v. Co2tey, supra, where the court said that as regards
the distribution of the property involved, the two factual situa-
tions were the same and that each group of heirs was entitled
to one-half of the estate."
53. Bierbrauer v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N.Y. Supp. 176 (4th
Dep't 1935). See Conway and Bertsche, supra note 23 at 17.
54. See Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948). In both
the Grose case and the Barnett case, the facts showed who was the sur-
vivor, and thus the statement made in the text that the two fact situations
would be dealt with in the same manner is based on dicta. However, in
Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951), where one tenant killed
the other, and there was no evidence as to who survived, the Florida
Supreme Court ruled that the heirs of each tenant were entitled to one-
half of the estate. Thus Florida has ruled clearly that the two sets of cir-
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This particular provision has been criticized on the ground
that its wording places too much emphasis on the legal signif-
icance of the term "joint tenancy" and fails to take into account
the equities that may exist as between the respective tenants. s
An illustration of this defect is seen in the case where A and B
(not husband and wife) take title to Blackacre as joint ten-
ants,56 A having paid seven-eighths of the purchase price and
B only one-eighth. On the death of A and B under circum-
stances giving no evidence of survivorship, the property would
be disposed of under the formula of the act equally among the
successors of A and B. The argument is that this result is
unfair to A's heirs in view of A's having contributed the greater
amount to the purchase price. In England there is a doctrine to
the effect that, even though tenants who have not paid the same
amounts toward the purchase price hold equal legal interests,
there is a resulting trust to each in proportion to his contribu-
tion.57 If the Uniform Act were the law in England, this provi-
sion would seem very unfair because it would deprive the heirs of
A, on the death of A and B in a common disaster, of the benefit
of a doctrine that would entitle them to a distribution according
to the equitable interests involved. However, in the United
States, where prior to the Uniform Act no such doctrine had
been developed and thus the interests of each joint tenant were
still deemed to be equal regardless of the inequality of pay-
ment,58 the act itself can only be criticized because it uses, of
necessity, a legal concept that does not recognize the equities as
between the parties. The new formula itself does not deprive
the heirs of the joint tenant who contributed more money of any
rights that they had before the Act. The defect is actually in
the basic legal concept itself rather than in the Uniform Act.
However, in the case of the death in a common accident of
tenants by the entireties, it is possible, though not probable, that
eumstanceB will not result in different distributions of the property in-
volved.
55. Conway and Betscbe, supra note 23 at 17.
56. Section 442.450 of the 1949 Revised Statutes of Missouri provides:
"Every interest in real estate granted or devised to two or more persons,
other than husband and wife, shall be a tenancy in common, unless ex-
pressly declared, in such grant or devise, to be in joint tenancy."
57. Lake v. Gibson, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 291, 21 Eng. Rep. 1052 (1729); 2
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 418 (3rd. ed. 1939).
58. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra, note 57 § 418.
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in Missouri a strict application of the statute in one situation
could produce inequities. In this jurisdiction, there is a doctrine
based on the statute providing for separate property for married
women 9 to the effect that where a husband without the written
consent of his wife invests her separate money in real estate
and takes title thereto in the names of himself and his wife, the
wife or her heirs,60 in spite of the fact that such a deed on its
face establishes a tenancy by the entireties,'1 are entitled to
attack the deed in equity with evidence showing the amount of
the wife's payment. If the wife or her heirs prevail, the court
of equity will then declare a trust in favor of the wife or her
heirs in the proportion that the money of the wife bears to the
full amount of the purchase money.c2 Thus when out of the
eighteen hundred dollars paid for the property, sixteen hundred
and fifty dollars was the money of the wife, improperly used by
the husband, and when the wife predeceased the husband, it was
ruled that the surviving husband held an undivided eleven-
twelfths of the land in trust for the use of the heirs of the wife
and the remaining one-twelfth in his own right in fee. 3 Would
the operation of the new formula in a similar factual setting
mean that the heirs of the wife, if she were to perish in a com-
mon disaster with her husband, would be deprived of the benefit
of this rule? In view of the prior Missouri decisions on the
issue of the legal effect of a deed to the two spouses under such
circumstances, an affirmative answer to the above question
would mean that the act could be, with reason, called unfair, but
since the same Missouri cases indicate clearly that the court will
look beyond the fact of the deed to determine the real character
of the estate, such a construction of the Uniform Act seems
highly improbable.6' Rather, it is reasonable to presume that
the Missouri courts will continue so to temper the general
59. Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 451.450 (1949).
60. Jones v. Elkins, 143 Mo. 651, 45 S.W. 262 (1898). There the heirs of
a wife who predeceased her husband were allowed to sue for her equitable
share.
61. Milligan v. Bing, 341 Mo. 648, 108 S.W.2d 108 (1937); Moss v.
Ardrey, 260 Mo. 595, 169 S.W. 6 (1914).
62. Donavon v. Griffith, 215 Mo. 149, 114 S.W. 625 (1908); McLeod v.
Venable, 163 Mo. 545, 63 S.W. 849 (1901); Jones v. Elkins, 143 Mo. 651,
45 S.W. 262 (1898).
63. Jones v. Elkins, 143 Mo. 651, 45 S.W. 262 (1898).
64. See note 62 supra.
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concept of tenancy by the entireties and thereby temper the
act itself.
In summary, it may be concluded that this section of the new
enactment represents a codification of the rule developed before
its adoption. In addition, the Adams cases demonstrates that
the Missouri courts will not limit the effect of the act to situa-
tions where the express term "joint tenancy" or "tenancy by
the entireties" is involved. Rather they will extend the opera-
tion of the section to situations where the evidence shows that
the commorientes treated the property as jointly owned. Lastly,
there is adequate basis for the prediction that in the case where
the husband uses his wife's separate property without her writ-
ten consent in order to buy real estate and takes title to the land
in both of their names and then both spouses die in a common
disaster, this section will not be strictly applied in Missouri.
Instead the case will be decided on the basis of the equities that
exist as between the spouses
V. THE PROVISION CONCERNING THE INSURED AND THE
BENEFICIARY
The fourth section of the Missouri Act provides:
Where the insured and the beneficiary in a policy of life or
accident insurance have died and there is no sufficient evi-
dence that they have died otherwise than simultaneously as
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the pro-
ceeds of the policy shall be distributed as if the insured had
survived the beneficiary.96
At common law, when the insured and the designated bene-
ficiary of an insurance or fraternal benefit policy died in the
same accident, and the beneficiary's interest was conditioned on
his survival of the insured, the same approach was employed
to decide who had the right to the proceeds as was used in the
cases involving the devolution of property under the intestacy
laws or under a will. There was no presumption of survivorship
or synchronous death, and the decisive issue in each case con-
cerned who was to have the burden of proof of survivorship, the
second beneficiary or the representatives of the insured or of
65. Adams v. Gardener, 237 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. App. 1951).
66. Mo. RnV. STAT. § 471.040 (1949).
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the first beneficiary.6T The determination of this particular ques-
tion turned on the interpretation of the respective rights of the
parties under each contract. These constructions fell into two
general groups.
The approach used in Missouri prior to the Uniform Act was
seen in the leading case of United States Casualty Co. v. Kacer.B
There the insured took out two insurance policies on his life and
named his daughter as beneficiary. No right to alter the bene-
ficiary was reserved in the policy, but the indemnity for loss of
life was made payable to "Miss Florence Yocum, daughter, if
surviving, if not, to the legal representatives of the insured. ' 69
The insured and his daughter died in a yacht accident, and there
was no evidence as to the order of their deaths. The court ruled
that since no power of divestiture had been provided for, the
primary beneficiary (the daughter) had a vested right in the
policy and the money to become due under it. The clause quoted
above was construed to be a condition subsequent, the proof of
which would divest the beneficiary's interest, and the burden of
establishing this condition was on the legal representatives of
the insured. In another Missouri decision arising out of the
same set of facts but involving a fraternal benefit certificate,
the burden of proof was switched to the heirs of the primary
beneficiary on the ground that, since the by-laws of the order
provided for displacement of the beneficiary at the will of the
insured, the daughter had no vested interest in the proceeds but
a mere expectancy which became effective only on proof of her
survivorship. 0
67. Miller v. McCarthy, 198 linn. 497, 270 N.W. 559 (1936); Fleming
v. Grimes, 142 Miss. 522, 107 So. 420 (1926); MacGowin v. Menken, 223
N.Y. 509, 119 N.E. 877 (1918). For a collection of cases, see note, 113
A.L.R. 881 (1938).
68. 169 Mo. 301, 69 S.W. 370 (1891). Accord: Cowman v. Rodgers,
73 Md. 403, 21 Atl. 64 (1891). Two cases went further than the Kacer
case, holding that the burden was on the representatives of the insured
where the insured had reserved the right to change the beneficiary and
where the policy provided that, if the beneficiary should die before the
insured, the interest of the beneficiary shall vest in the insured. See
Watkins v. Home Life Ins. Co., 137 Ark. 207, 208 S.W. 587 (1919);
Roberts v. Hardin, 179 Ga. 114, 175 S.E. 362 (1934). Maryland and
Arkansas have now adopted the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. ARK.
STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 124-130 (1947); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 35,§§ 89-96 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
69. United States Casualty Co. v. Kacer, 169 Mo. 301, 69 S.W. 370
(1891).
70. Supreme Council of Royal Arcanum v. Kacer, 96 Mo. App. 93, 69
S.W. 671 (1902).
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However, the decision in United States Caesulty V. Kacer,
supra, i.e., that the burden of proving the survivorship of the
insured was on the heirs of the insured, was followed in only a
minority of states. The majority common law rule was that
whatever rights, whether denominated vested or otherwisen
that the beneficiary had under the policy, his outliving the in-
sured, at least in cases where the insured had reserved the right
to change the beneficiary, was a condition precedent to his right
to the proceeds. Thus the onus of establishing the happening
of this condition was on the representatives of the first bene-
ficiary.72 Several courts held that the burden was on the bene-
ficiary's heirs when the insured had reserved in the policy the
right to alter the named beneficiary and where there was a
clause to the effect that the proceeds were payable to the bene-
ficiary only if he (the beneficiary) survived, otherwise to the
representatives of the insured. 3 The presence of the last men-
tioned clause in the policy was the chief ground used by other
tribunals in reaching the same result.7' But regardless of the
rationale of each decision, the practical outcome was that the
money was payable to the heirs of the insured.
It will be observed that in all the insurance cases noted above,
there was a clause in the policy to the effect that the insurance
was payable to the first beneficiary, if surviving, otherwise to
someone else. This similarity suggests one very important fact:
that the dispute as to who has the prior right to the insurance
money can arise only in situations where the survival of the
beneficiary is a prerequisite to his rights to the proceeds. Other-
wise, there is obviously no problem. Thus in a case where the
interest of the beneficiary is not dependent on his living longer
than the insured, it is apparent that the representatives of the
71. There was considerable difference of opinion in the cases as to
what was the exact nature of the primary beneficiary's interests. Compare
Watkins v. Home Life Ins. Co., 137 Ark. 207, 208 S.W. 587 (1919) with
Colovos v. Gouvas, 269 Ky. 752, 108 S.W.2d 820 (1930).
72. See note 67 supra.
73. Miller v. McCarthy, 198 Minn. 497, 270 N.W. 559 (1936); Fleming
v. Grimes, 142 Miss. 552, 107 So. 420 (1926); Supreme Council of Royal
Arcanum v. Kacer, 96 Mo. App. 93, 69 S.W. 671 (1902); MacGowin v. Men-
ken, 223 N.Y, 509, 119 N.E. 877 (1918).
74. Sovereign Camp, W.W. v. McKinnon, 48 F.2d 383 (1931); Colovos V.
Gouvas, 269 Ky. 752, 108 S.W.2d 820 (1937); Masonic Temple Ass'n V.
Hannum, 120 N.J. Eq. 183, 184 Atl. 414 (1936); Baldus v. Jeremias, 296
Pa. 313, 145 Atl. 830 (1929).
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insured would be in no position to contest the right of the heirs
of the beneficiary to the proceeds of the policy if the insured
and the beneficiary were to die in a common disaster. The case
of Diehm v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co.75 seems to be
an example of such a set of circumstances. There the insurance
company wrote a policy on the life of one Wesler for the benefit
of his wife and his children by her. The contract further
provided that the proceeds on proof of death of the insured were
to be paid "to the said beneficiary or their executors, adminis-
trators or assigns... ." and that "in the case of the death of the
said beneficiary before the death of the person whose life is
assured the amount of assurance shall be payable at maturity
to the heirs or assigns of the said person whose life is assured.",
The plaintiff was the representative of certain grandchildren
of the insured. The grandchildren were the issue of a daughter
of the insured who was living at the time that the policy was
issued but who had predeceased her father. He argued that
his wards were entitled to theik mother's share of the assurance
money, and the court upheld his contention on the ground that
the mother had a vested interest in the proceeds which went
to the heirs on her death. As regards the two contradictory
clauses quoted above, the court ruled that the intention ex-
pressed by the provision that the money should be paid to the
beneficiaries or their executors, administrators or assigns pre-
vailed over the effect of the clause which gave to the heirs of the
insured the interest of any beneficiary who predeceased the
insured. It is apparent from this opinion that the daughter's
survivorship was not deemed a prerequisite to her heirs' right
to the proceeds, and it seems unreasonable to say that the court
would have reached a different result if the daughter had per-
ished in a common disaster with her father instead of having
died before him. The problem in both situations, i.e., the effect
of the daughter's failure to outlive her father, is still the same.
What will be the impact of the new law on these common law
rules? In those jurisdictions which adopted the majority rule,
it is apparent that the act will leave the law unchanged on the
question of whose heirs get the proceeds of the policy in ques-
75. 129 Mo. App. 256, 108 S.W. 139 (1908).
76. Id. at 260, 108 S.W. at 140.
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tion." Under the burden of proof method in those states, the
heirs of the insured received the money. The same result will be
forthcoming with the application of the presumption that the
insured outlived the primary beneficiary since there will be no
time under the presumption during which the title to the pro-
ceeds will vest in the beneficiary so as to constitute a part of
his estate at his death. If the proceeds are not part of the
beneficiary's property, his heirs will have no right to them.
However, in Missouri the act will alter the outcome in situations
where the insured has not in the policy provided for the right
to change the beneficiary. In the Kacer case, supra, the heirs
of the beneficiary got the money in such a factual setting, but
with the Uniform Act, the heirs of the insured will win since
the insured will be presumed to have survived. It is submitted
that the new enactment produces a result more in line with
the probable intention of the insured. It would be rather un-
reasonable to presume that the insured would have wanted the
heirs of the beneficiary to take the proceeds of the policy in
preference to his own successors in case the beneficiary could
not take. 8
In addition, with respect to the particular question raised by
the Diehm case, supra, much can be said to sustain the propo-
sition that in a situation where there is a provision that the
policy is payable to the beneficiary or his executors, adminis-
trators, or assigns and the beneficiary and insured die simul-
taneously in the contemplation of the law, the identical decision
would be reached under the new formula that was reached in
the Diehm case. There is considerable evidence to the effect
that the act does not even apply in cases where the beneficiary's
right to the proceeds is not contingent on his survivorship of
the insured.79 The terms of the section do not expressly say
that its application is so limited, but two factors indicate that
77. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 118 (3rd ed. 1951).
78. See Fleming v. Grimes, 142 Miss. 552, 107 So. 420 (1926); Supreme
Council of Royal Arcanum v. Kacer, 96 Mo. App. 93, 69 S.W. 671 (1902);
Masonic Temple Ass'n v. Hannum, 120 N.J. Eq. 183, 194 At]. 414 (1936);
Matter of Burza, 151 Misc. 577, 272 N.Y. Supp. 248 (Surr. Ct. 1934).
79. See Miller v. McCarthy, 198 Minn. 497, 500, 270 N.W. 559, 561(1936) where the court observed: "The policy is payable to Florence [the
beneficiary of the policy who died in a common accident with the insured],
not to Florence or the representative of her estate." See also Conway and
Bertsche, supra note 23 at 17.
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such is the case. Under an earlier draft of the act, there was a
section covering situations, "where the persons perishing are so
related to each other under the terms of a contract that the
disposition of property depends upon their relative times of
survival."80 As an example of when this provision would be
invoked, Dean Wigmore gave a hypothetical case in which the
rights of the beneficiaries of an insurance policy were dependent
on their outliving the insured."1 It does not seem reasonable to
assume that the Commissioners, just because they later made
a specific provision for insurance policies where before there
had been none, had thereby changed their conception of the
problem. This consideration, plus the fact that the purpose of
the act is to solve the problem arising when the question of
survivorship is the important factor as regards the distribution
of the property, indicates strongly that the insurance provision
applies only when the answer to that question is decisive.A2 On
the basis of these factors, it seems clear that, in the case in
which the policy is payable to the beneficiary or "his executors,
administrators, or assigns," the new act should not then apply
and the heirs of the beneficiary shall have the prior right.8'
VI. THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTE
Since the Uniform Act is brought into operation only when
there is no sufficient evidence that the parties involved died
otherwise than simultaneously, we may inquire as to the legal
meaning of the word "simultaneously." Ohio has a statutory
provision applicable to the common disaster problem which says
that as far as the distribution of property is concerned, when
the surviving party in a common disaster situation dies as a
80. 1939 HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFE ENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 211.
81. Id. at 194.
82. Commissioner's Prefatory Note, Uniform Simultaneous Death Act,
9A U.L.A. 264 (1951).
83. See VANcE, INSURANCE § 115 (3rd ed. 1951). Similarly, it would
seem that the Act would not apply in other factual settings where the
survival of the beneficiary is not a condition precedent to his right; for
example, where the beneficiary is in reality the party who contracts for
an insurance policy on the life of another person. Bradshaw v. Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 187 N. Y. 347, 80 N.E. 203 (1907). But see Thompson V.
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 161 Iowa 446, 143 N.W. 518 (1913),
where on substantially the same facts the court held that the secondary
beneficiaries rather than the heirs of the primary beneficiaries were entitled
to the proceeds even though the primary beneficiary procured the policy.
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result of the same accident within thirty days of the first dece-
dent, the property of the first decedent shall be disposed of as
if he had survived the second.4 The Commissioners seem to
have had the same idea in mind when they wrote into a prior
draft of the act a provision to the effect that in order that a
survivor be entitled to take from the person predeceasing him,
the survivor must have had a "clear period of consciousness"
during the interval between deaths.8 5 This phrase was omitted
from the final version of the act after having been criticized for
its vagueness,', but Dean Wigmore contended that a provision
of this type is more likely to be in line with the probable inten-
tion of the property owner t7 His contention was that the
ancestor or testator certainly would not have intended the
property to go to the next of kin of his heir or devisee simply
because the heir or devisee breathed a few moments longer than
he (the ancestor or testator) did.
On the other hand, the New York rule is that if the evidence
is adequate to show that one death occurred one second after
the other, then the property shall be distributed to the heirs of
the survivor.8  The Missouri Supreme Court applied the same
rule in Taylor v. Cawood.89 There a father, who based his claim
to his wife's estate on the survivorship by his infant child of his
wife, was allowed to prevail when the evidence proved that the
child lived a few minutes after the mother's death. Thus in
Missouri the new enactment cannot be invoked if there is suffi-
cient evidence to show that one commorient lived a very short
time after the other.
What are the relative merits of these two general rationales?
Dean Wigmore's argument seems much more in line with the
probable intent of the decedent whose property is to be dis-
tributed. However, it is understandable why the "clear period
of consciousness" test was omitted from the final draft of the
Uniform Act; its vagueness would make for difficulty in prac-
84. OHIO GENERAL CODE ANN. § 10503-18 (Page, 1935).
85. 1939 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 211.
86. Id. at 212.
87. 9 WIGM.ORE, EviDENCE § 2532a (3rd ed. 1940).
88. In re Fowles' Will, 22 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918); In re Di
Bella's Estate, 100 N.Y.S. 2d 263 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
89. 211 S.W. 47 (Mo. 1919).
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tical application. There remains the approach used in the Ohio
statute. Such a rule might be questioned on the grounds that
the power of the legislature to set up presumptive rules of
evidence is qualified
in that the fact upon which the presumption or inference
is to rest must have some relation to or natural connection
with the fact to be inferred, and that the inference of the
existence of the fact to be inferred from the existence of
the fact proved must not be purely arbitrary or wholly
unreasonable, unnatural, or extraordinary.90
The Ohio statute seems to fly directly in the face of this limita-
tion because in spite of the fact that it is definitely established
that one party survived, if the survivor died as a result of the
same accident within thirty days of the first decedent, then the
first decedent is presumed to have survived for the purpose of
the distribution of the first decedent's estate. But the answer
to this apparent conflict is that the legislature would not be
setting up a rule of evidence but rather a rule for the distribu-
tion of property, an area over which it does have power.91 It
seems reasonable to say that the ancestor or testator would prob-
ably not have wanted the successors to his heir (or devisee) to
take his property because his heir (or devisee) outlived him for
a brief moment; rather, he probably would have desired in that
event that his (the ancestor's or testator's) other heirs (or
devisees) would take the deceased heir's share. This would
seem to be especially true in the case where a testator has
provided for a gift over in the event that the devisee predeceases
him. There the testator at least has indicated that he has
thought about the problem and that he deems the survivorship
of the beneficiary an important element in the beneficiary's
right to take. On these grounds, then, it is submitted that a
statute along the lines of the Ohio provision would be a valuable
supplement to the Uniform Act.
The definition of the phrase "no sufficient evidence" should also
be considered here since that phrase providies the basis for re-
butting the implied presumption of simultaneous death and thus
limiting the operation of the act. However, to cover adequately
the subject of what amount and type of evidence has been re-
90. City of St. Louis v. Cook, 359 Mo. 270, 221 S.W.2d 468 (1949).
91. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556. 562 (1942); State ex ret.
McClintock v. Guinotte, 275 Mo. 298, 204 S.W. 806 (1918).
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quired to prove survivorship would go far beyond the scope of
this note. Consequently, only a brief discussion will be made,
and the reader will be referred to an exhaustive article on that
particular point.'2
At common law there was a spectrum of variation in the
amount of evidence required to prove survivorship. One extreme
was seen in the case of PeU v. Ball,93 where the court said that
"where there is any evidence whatever, ven though it be but
a shadow, it must govern in the decision of the fact." A different
view is found in the statement that:
it is not sufficient that the circumstances of the case be
consistent with respondent's theory [i.e., that one party
survived]. They must be inconsistent with any other reason-
able theory equally deducible therefrom."4
The case of Stewart v. Russell, supra, shows that Missouri fol-
lowed the idea expressed in the second quotation. There the
deaths resulted from the escape of gas from a defective water
heater. The expert witnesses for the plaintiff testified that they
were of the opinion that the daughter survived because the
autopsies performed on the three decedents showed that the body
of the daughter had a smaller percentage of carbon monoxide in
her blood than the other two persons. However, the defendants'
expert witnesses disputed the conclusion that the difference in
the percentage of carbon monoxide in the blood was decisive on
the question of who had survived, and in view of this disagree-
ment among the experts, the court said that it could not decide
the fact of survivorship on that evidence alone. The court
further pointed out that the ascertainment of the fact depended
on a number of other factors, including the respective times that
the decedents entered the gas-filled rooms and the relative
amount of exercise that each decedent had after entering, and
that since there was no evidence on those questions, it was
impossible to form any reasonable conclusion as to survivorship.95
On the other hand, two Missouri cases indicate what standard
was employed to prove survivorship prior to the new enactment.
In Warren v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,98 a man and his wife,
92. Tracy and Adams, supra note 5 at 801.
93. 1 Cheves Eq. 99, 103 (S.C. 1840).
94. Estate of W\°allace, 64 Cal. App. 107, 113, 220 Pac. 682, 684 (1923).
95. To the same effect, see Abrams v. Unknown Heirs of Rice, 317 Mo.
216, 295 S.W. 83 (1927).
96. 202 Mo. App. 1, 213 S.W. 527 (1919).
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who were employees on a steamboat, perished when the boat
capsized in a storm. Two witnesses testified that they saw the
wife alive in the river approximately one and one-half minutes
after the boat turned over, and there was uncontradicted testi-
mony that the husband's body was underneath the ship's hull
until the boat was righted. The court ruled that the wife's sur-
vivorship was established by "preponderance of the testimony.""
In Taylor v. Cawood" the rights of the claimants depended on
whether an infant, after being completely born, survived its
mother, who died in the process of childbirth. There, on the basis
of testimony by three doctors that they heard the baby make a
sound a minute or two after its birth plus the testimony of a
nurse that she detected a faint heartbeat in the child the same
length of time after the birth, the court ruled that a prima facie
case that the baby survived had been made and that it was sup-
ported by "substantial evidence.""
At this point, it should be noted that, since the phrase "suffi-
cient evidence" does not by its very terms adopt the generally
accepted descriptions of the various burdens of proof, such as
"preponderance of the evidence" or "clear and convincing" or
"beyond a reasonable doubt," it would seem that the courts in
construing the phrase would not be bound to equate it to any
one of the common descriptive wordings. Rather, it would seem
to be within their discretion to say that the phrase sets up a
new and different standard of proof if they felt that such was
the case. Whether the change in the wording would really mean
that in practice there would be a qualitative difference in the
evidence that was "sufficient" and that which constituted a pre-
ponderance is questionable,'00 but this fact would not prevent the
courts' saying that the two definitions connote different stand-
ards. If the courts should take this view, i.e., that the phrase
does set up a unique requirement of proof, then it follows that
the decisions prior to the Uniform Act would not be of much
help in future cases in deciding what evidence was sufficient
because they were not decided on that basis. However, such an
approach does not seem likely if only because it would leave the
courts without a reference point from which to commence their
97. Id. at 15, 213 S.W. at 530.
98. 211 S.W. 47 (Mo. 1919).
99. Id. at 50.
100. See 9 WI1GMOR1, EvmENCE § 2498 (3rd ed. 1940).
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consideration of the legal meaning of the phrase. Rather, it is
probable that the phrase will be interpreted in relation to those
phrases in general use before the Uniform Act. It is well then
to attempt to ascertain which of the accepted standards will most
closely approximate the meaning of the phrase "no sufficient
evidence."
It will be noted that in the Warren case, the evidence was de-
scribed by the court as constituting a "preponderance of the
testimony." In Taylor v. Cawood, the court said that the infant's
survivorship was established by "substantial evidence." In view
of the fact that the term "sufficient evidence" is defined in State
ex rel. Sterling v. Shain1 as signifying "that amount of proof
which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind beyond a reason-
able doubt,"102 an interesting question is raised as to whether,
if two identical cases were to arise under the new enactment, the
same proof would be considered "sufficient." The Sterling case,
involved an action in equity to set aside a default judgment
entered against plaintiff in an earlier suit because of the alleged
negligence of the circuit clerk in not making the answer of the
plaintiff (who was the defendant in the case where the default
judgment was given) a matter of record, and the court ruled
that the negligence of the clerk must be established by evidence
that will satisfy the reasonable doubt test The court also said
that the above definition described the same degree of proof as
that required to set aside a judgment because of fraud committed
in the procurement of such judgment, i.e., the evidence must be
so cogent, clear, strong and convincing as to leave no reasonable
doubt of such fraud in the minds of the chancellor.203 No matter
which of the above definitions is employed to describe the phrase
"sufficient evidence," it seems clear that both are customarily
used to characterize a higher degree of proof than "preponder-
ance of the testimony."' 0 ' Similarly, in another Missouri case
involving a suit to set aside a judgment obtained by fraud,10 5 the
101. 344 Mo. 891, 129 S.W.2d 1048 (1939).
102. Id. at 897, 129 S.W.2d at 1051. See also Kenney v. Hannibal & St.
Joseph R.R., 70 Mo. 243 (1879).
103. State ex reL. Sterling v. Shain, 344 Mo. 891, 897, 129 S.W.2d 1048,
1051 (1939). This apparently is the usual quantum of proof required in
such equitable actions. See 9 WIGMORe' EVIDENCE § 2498 (3rd ed. 1940).
104. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2497-2498 (3rd. ed. 1940).
105. Terminal R. R. Assn of St. Louis v. Schmidt, 349 Mo. 890, 163
S.W.2d 772 (1942). The court based its statement on State ez reL. Sterling
v. Shain, 344 Mo. 891, 129 S.W.2d 1048 (1939). The terma "substantial
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss3/5
428 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
phrase "substantial evidence" has expressly been ruled not to
describe as great a quantum of proof as the phrase "sufficient
evidence." Thus a literal application of the definition of the
Sterling case could mean that proof of survivorship by a mere
preponderance or by substantial evidence would not be adequate.
However, there are very forceful arguments against such a
construction of the phrase. In the first place, State ex rel. Sterling
v. Shai, is clearly distinguishable on its facts; it involved
no problem of survivorship. It is entirely possible that a differ-
ent definition of the phrase "sufficient evidence" would be em-
ployed in an action to set aside a default judgment than would
be used in a common disaster case. Secondly, although the Mis-
souri decisions above on the question of the quantum of proof
required to prove survivorship did not specifically deal with this
question, they do indicate that the doctrine of stare decisis will
not work in favor of construing the phrase in the Uniform Act
according to the definition given to it in the Sterling case. Lastly,
the Appellate Court of Illinois has interpreted the phrase to
mean nothing more than a mere preponderance of the testimony
and has expressiy rejected the contention that it describes that
amount of proof which ordinarily satisfies an unprejudiced mind
beyond a reasonable doubt. 06 Thus it seems unlikely that the
Missouri courts will adopt the Sterling interpretation. Whether
they will construe the phrase in the same way that the Appellate
Court of Illinois did is, of course, uncertain, but in view of the
statements made in Missouri decisions prior to the Uniform
Act concerning the required degree of proof, it seems probable
that Missouri will follow the Illinois ruling.
Before leaving the question of what evidence of survivorship
is sufficient, we should note that the Missouri version of the
Uniform Simultaneous Death Act is different from the draft
as adopted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in that
the Missouri law designates that the sufficiency of the evidence
evidence" has been defined as "evidence from which the triers of fact
reasonably could find the issue in harmony therewith." State v. Gregory,
339 Mo. 133, 96 S.W.2d 47 (1936); Walter v. Alt, 348 Mo. 53, 152 S.W.2d
135 (1941).
106. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Spain, 339 Ill. App. 476. 90 N.E.2d 256 (1950).
See also Sauers v. Stolz, 121 Colo. 456, 218 P.2d 741 (1950), where the
court said: "The presumption of simultaneous death of the parties was not
intended to take the place of competent positive and direct evidence, and the
fact of survivorship requires no higher degree of proof than any other fact
in the case." Id. at 458, 218 P.2d at 742
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of survivorship shall be determined by "a court of competent
jurisdiction."1°7 The term "court of competent jurisdiction" has
been defined in another connection as "a court of general juris-
diction, whether federal, state or territorial."108 It does not seem
that such an interpretation would be descriptive of the kind of
court contemplated by the Uniform Act because that construction
would oust the power of the probate courts, which by statute
have jurisdiction in cases involving the devolution of property. 0 9
In addition, where the property in dispute is the proceeds of an
insurance policy and the amount of money involved is within
the statutory limits prescribed for magistrate court jurisdiction,
the magistrate courts would have power to try the case.110 It is
clear that the circuit courts are also courts of "competent juris-
diction." They have exclusive original jurisdiction in civil cases
which are not cognizable before the probate courts and magis-
trate courts, 11 and have appellate jurisdiction from the judg-
ments and orders of those two courts.11 2 Their power also in-
cludes concurrent jurisdiction with the magistrate court when
the sum demanded exceeds fifty dollars.11
In still another way, unrelated to the above limitations, the
scope of the Uniform Act is cut down. This limitation is sug-
gested in the case of Garbee v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.114
There an infant died with his mother and father when one of
defendant's trains struck the automobile in which all three were
riding, and the administrator of the infant brought suit for the
child's death. Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the child, mother,
and father were all killed at the same time. This averment was
necessary since if either the mother or the father or both sur-
vived the deceased infant, the cause of action vested in the
survivor or survivors and the action could not then be maintained
by the child's administrator. Defendant contended that since
there was no presumption of synchronous death to aid the plain-
107. Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, 9A U.L.A. 265-268 (1951). See
also Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 471.010-471.040 (1949).
108. Stewart v. Hiclknan, 36 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Mo. 1941).
109. Mo. REV. STAT. § 481.020 (1949).
110. Mo. REV. STAT. § 482.090 (1949).
111. Mo. RLEV. STAT. § 478.070 (1949).
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid. All the Missouri cases concerning the distribution of the
estates of commorientes were tried at one stage or another in the circuit
courts.
114. 220 Mo. App. 1245, 290 S.W. 655 (1927).
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tiff, the burden devolved on him (plaintiff) to prove that all
three died at the same instant. The court conceded for the pur-
poses of argument that defendant's position on the law was
valid, but then proceeded to rule that the great impact of the
collision, the fact that the automobile was knocked a considerable
distance from the crossing where the accident occurred, and the
fact that the record showed that the dead bodies were put on the
train when it backed up constituted substantial evidence that the
three decedents had perished simultaneously. Would the clause
of the Uniform Act which provides in effect that the property
of each commorient shall be distributed as if he had survived
mean that, if a similar case were to arise after the new act, the
plaintiff could sustain his right to sue for the child's death on
the ground that as regards the child's property the child is
deemed to have survived? The application of the act to this
factual situation would certainly give a stronger ground for
sustaining the child's administrator's right to sue than ruling on
the basis of the evidence above that the three died at the same
split-second and that therefore the administrator of the infant
could sue. In view of the difficulty of proving such a fact, the
evidentiary factors used in the Garbee case to establish it seems
inadequate at best.12 However, the first clause of the new enact-
ment applies only when the devolution of property depends on
the issue of survivorship, and it has been ruled in Missouri that
an action for wrongful death is not a part of the decedent's
estate."26 Such a decision would seem to make it clear that the
Uniform Act could not be used to aid in solving the problems
raised in such cases when there is no evidence as to who survived.
Still another aspect in which the scope of the new act is limited
is found in the fact that the clause expressly requires that the
order of death of two or more persons be the source of the
problem. The case of Durrant v. Friendl7 is illustrative. There a
testator bequeathed some chattels to certain legatees. He then
insured the chattels and took them with him on a voyage. The
testator and chattels were both lost at sea, and the question arose
as to whether the legatee or the executors of the estate had the
115. See Note, 13 Mo. L. Rnv. 230 (1948).
116. Demattei v. Missouri, Kansas, Texas R.R, 345 Mo. 1136, 139 S.W.2d
505 (1940); Donelson's Estate v. Gorman, 239 Mo. App. 300, 192 S.W.2d
29 (1946).
1117. 2 De G. & S. 343, 64 Eng. Rep. 1145 (1852).
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right to the insurance proceeds. If the testator had perished
before the chattels, then the interest in them would have vested
in the legatee, who would in turn have been entitled to the
insurance proceeds. But if the testator had died after the chattels
were lost, the benefit of the policy would have passed to the
executors. The court ruled for the executors on the ground that
the testator had died at the same instant that the chattels had
been destroyed and that thus the legatees never had an interest
in the chattels. In such a factual setting, the word "persons"
would preclude the operation of the statute.
An express provision in the new act gives the basis for another
way in which the scope of the statute is cut down. Section
471.060 provides that the law,
shall not apply in the case of wills, living trusts, deeds, or
contracts of insurance wherein provision has been made for
distribution of property different from the provisions of
this law.118
This section shows that the act was not intended to set up an
unchangeable rule of property but was rather to apply only in
the absence of an appropriate legal instrument showing the
property owner's real state of mind.119 However, in order that
there should be no question of the instrument's efficacy, one
caveat should be observed. It is that the event which will bring
into operation the provision aimed at preventing the application
of the statute should not be described as a "common disaster."
In the first place, such a term might well give rise to the argu-
ment that the decedents did not die in a "disaster" in that they
did not die in a public calamity 120 and that thus the provision
excluding the statute does not apply. The second reason for not
using the term "common disaster" is that the problem of sur-
vivorship which the provision was aimed at solving might arise
even though the parties did not die as the result of the same
118. Mo. REV. STAT. § 471.060 (1949). Another express limitation on
the operation of the Missouri version of the Uniform Simultaneous Death
Act is Section 471.040, which provides: "This law shall not apply to the
distribution of property of a person who has died before it takes effect."
This provision, although important, is self-explanatory and for that reason
was not included in the text. See Stewart v. Russell, 227 S.W.2d 1011 (Mo.
1950).
119. For a case construing a will provision intended to cover the pos-
sibility of the testator's and the devisee's dying under circumstances from
which the order of their deaths could not be ascertained, see In re Fowles'
Will, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918).
120. See Tracy and Adams, supra note 5 at 801.
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accident. The question of which party lived longer will become
important not only when the time of death of each party in
different events are both unknown but also where the time of
death of one of the decedents is established and the relative time
of death of the other in another event or place is not known.
Yet if the phrase "common disaster" were used, the clause
intended to preclude the statute could not be employed because
it could not be said that the parties in those circumstances died
in the same accident.
Similarly, the operation of the act, although subject to the
above limitations, should not be applied only to those cases where
the deaths of the parties were caused by the same force or unfor-
tunate event. The history of the new act hows that the Commis-
sioners did not intend to have the statute so limited.121 The terms
of the statute say that it is to apply in cases where the "title to
property or the devolution thereof depends upon priority of
death and there is no sufficient evidence that the persons have
died otherwise than simultaneously. ' 122 Such words can hardly
be construed to mean that they apply only to common disaster
situations. Rather, they cover other factual settings where
property rights depend on the order of death and there is no
sufficient evidence of that sequence. Thus the act should be
invoked where the ancestor perishes in a train wreck in one state
and his heir drowns in another state and there is inadequate
proof of the order of their respective demises.
In addition, a strong argument can be made that the new
statute offers a basis for solving the problem raised in the case
of In re Buck's Estate.2 3 There a beneficiary under his uncle's
will had disappeared approximately one year before his uncle
died. After waiting a period of more than seven years, after
which the common law presumption of death of the legatee arose,
the mother of the legatee brought suit to have the legacy paid
to her. The establishment of the survivorship of the beneficiary
over his uncle was necessary to the mother's case because if the
beneficiary had predeceased the testator, the legacy would have
adeemed. Since in Missouri the presumption of death from seven
years' absence extends only to the fact of death and not to the
121. See Comment, 7 MD. L. REV. 330 (1943) and 1938 HANDBOOK OF
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COIIMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 277.
122. Mo. REv. STAT. § 471.010 (1949).
123. 204 Mo. App. 1, 220 S.W. 716 (1920).
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time of death,'124 neither side had the benefit of a presumption as
to exactly when the legatee had perished. No evidence as to that
factual issue was introduced, but the court ruled on the basis of
the presumption of the continuance of life and the presumption
against suicide that the beneficiary survived his uncle and that
thus the mother was entitled to the legacy. It seems clear that
there was no sufficient evidence that the nephew had survived
his uncle.' 5 Furthermore, it can be argued that there was no
sufficient evidence that the parties died otherwise than simul-
taneously on the grounds that that clause is just another way
of describing the problem raised when there is inadequate evi-
dence of who outlived whom. On this rationale, the Uniform Act
would have been applicable to the facts of In re Buck's Estate,
if it had been the law at that time, and would have led to a
different result. Since under the formula of the act, the property
would have been distributed as if the testator had survived, the
legacy would have adeemed and the mother's claim would have
failed. Therefore the adoption by the courts of this extended
interpretation of the new enactment would mean a change in this
aspect of the law.
On the other hand, there are arguments that the Uniform
Simultaneous Death Act should not receive such a broad con-
struction. The act under discussion and the Uniform Absence
as Evidence of Death and Absentee's Property Act were orig-
inally parts of the Uniform Presumption of Death Act.2 On
the basis of this fact, it might be contended that since the two
proposed acts were first drafted together, the Commissioners
intended that the operation of each one should be limited strictly
to the factual situation set forth by its wording. Some support
for this contention may be found in the fact that the Absentee's
Property Act has a section in its general provision concerning
the disposition of money from insurance policies of the absentee
which says:
Where the survival of a named beneficiary is not established
the provisions of this Act shall apply as if the proceeds of
the insurance were a part of the estate of the absentee.2,1
124. Ferril v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 345 Mo. 774, 137 S.W.2d 577
(1939); Hancock, Adm'r v. American Life Ins. Co., 62 Mo. 26 (1876).
125. Thayer, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE CoiMON LAW
337 (1898).
126. 1937 HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL CONFEkENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAwS 236.
127. Uniform Absence as Evidence of Death and Absentee's Property
Act, § 10(3), 9 U.L.A. 1 (1951).
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The contention could be made that since the Commissioners made
this specific provision in the Absentee's Property Act to cover the
problem raised when the beneficiary's survival is not established,
they intended to preclude the operation of the Uniform Simul-
taneous Death Act. However, such evidence on the question of
intent seems meager at best, and the first argument made for
not applying the new act to the situation outlined in Re Buck's
Estate, would surely not prevail in Missouri, since Missouri has
not adopted the Uniform Absence as Evidence of Death and
Absentee's Property Act. Perhaps because the history of the
adoption of the Missouri Uniform Simultaneous Death Act indi-
cates nothing as to what the legislators wanted the act to mean,12 '
the court in its interpretation would consider the expressions of
intent by the Commissioners, but the above evidence could hardly
be considered adequate grounds for reaching a particular result.
The problem then becomes one of judicial construction of the
terms of the act, which in turn means in substance deciding
what the phrase "and there is no sufficient evidence that the
persons died otherwise than simultaneously" means. The court
might say that the terms of the act limit it to those situations
in which the probability is that the decedents died within a very
short time of each other but there is inadequate evidence of the
order of death. This would seem to rule out the set of facts
involving the question of whether an absentee survived another
decedent (or absentee) since the probability there is that the
parties did not die within a short time of each other. But this
construction seems rather unreal. The broad application men-
tioned above recommends itself as being the more reasonable.
CONCLUSION
From the above discussion several observations may be made:
1. The new enactment represents a codification of the generally
accepted common law rules used in common disaster cases.
In Missouri that proposition is true so far as the devolution
of the property of commorientes is concerned, but the insur-
ance provision of the Uniform Act has changed the law as
it was annouced in United States Casualty Co. v. Kacer with
128. JOURNAL MO. HoUsU, 64th Gen. Ass. 207, 242, 776, 1017, 1106 (1947) ;
JOURNAL MO. SEN., 64th Gen. Ass. 83, 97, 329, 541, 584, 596, 601, 614, 940,
978, 1010, 1252, 1256, 1271, 1285 (1947).
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regard to the disposition of the proceeds of an insurance
policy.
2. The case of Adamns v. Gardener indicates that the Missouri
courts will apply the joint tenancy provision to cases where
the parties who died simultaneously in the contemplation of
the law treated the property as jointly owned as well as to
the two types of relationships to which the provision is ex-
pressly directed.
3. The provision with regard to the disposition of property
limited to successive beneficiaries is of doubtful utility, from
the point of view of practical application, and could be im-
proved by the additions of the phrase "or alternately" after
the word "successively" and the phrase "or alternate" after
the word "successive."
4. The new act will probably leave the law of Missouri unaltered
in at least four important respects:
(a) In spite of State ex rel. Sterling v. Shain, the quantum of
evidence required to prove survivorship of one of the dece-
dents and thus to preclude the operation of the statute will
probably be something closely akin to "preponderance of the
evidence."
(b) Establishing by sufficient proof that one of the decedents
outlived the other by only a few moments will be adequate
grounds for allowing the survivor to take from the person
predeceasing him. However, it is submitted that the adoption
of a statute along the lines of the Ohio statute discussed above
would be a valuable supplement to the Uniform Act.
(c) When the issue of which decedent of a group of related
decedents died first is determinative of the question of which
administrator of all the representatives of the decedents will
be entitled to sue for wrongful death, the act probably will
not be applicable since in Missouri an action for wrongful
death is not a part of the decedent's estate and since the act
applies only when the devolution of property depends on the
question of survivorship.
(d) The doctrine that the court will declare a trust in favor
of a wife or her heirs on proof that the husband has used the
wife's separate property without her written consent to buy
real estate and has taken title to the property in both of their
names will not apparently be changed if the husband and wife
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1952/iss3/5
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should die in a common disaster and the act should then
become applicable. The past decisions have shown that the
Missouri courts will rule on the basis of the contributions
made by each tenant instead of deciding according to the
apparent tenancy by the entireties evidenced by the deed. It
seems reasonable to say that this modification of the strict
operation of the legal rules in this particular factual situation
will be applied when there is a problem of survivorship as well
as when there is not.
5. Where there is a provision in an insurance policy to the effect
that its proceeds are payable to the beneficiary or his execu-
tors, administrators or assigns, considerable evidence can be
marshalled to sustain the proposition that then the new
statute will not apply.
6. When the question arises of whether or not a party absent for
seven years has survived another person, the terms of the new
act seem clearly to provide a basis of decision, since in those
circumstances as well as when the parties die as a result of
the same force, "there is no sufficient evidence that the
persons.died otherwise than simultaneously."
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